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For at least the past decade, the workload of the Supreme
Court of the United States has been too great to dispatch efficiently and thoughtfully within an annual term. Ten years ago, almost everyone except the Justices themselves agreed that there
was a serious problem. (The Court, of course, was divided.) The
only question was what, if anything, should be done about it. Today, the Court is virtually united, but only in recognizing the existence of a problem. At the conclusion of October Term 1981, seven
Justices-speaking individually and extrajudicially-certified that
they had too much to do each year to perform at a level that the
profession and the country are entitled to expect. But the question
remained, what to do?
Before any debate-if there is to be a serious debate and not
simply an annual end-of-term amusement on the op-ed
pages-focuses exclusively on remedies, it is necessary to look
more carefully at the problems. The right answer depends on the
right question. Too often, the Court and its critics define the
problems in terms of numbers: too many petitions for certiorari,
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too few decisions on the merits, too many individual opinions, and
too much time between the date of filing a case and the date of its
disposition. These are important factors, but only because they are
symptoms of deeper problems. The real trouble with the Court's
workload is the effect on the quality of the Court's work product.
The Court's response to a greater workload has been to hire more
staff and to have its staff produce more, and longer, opinions. Unfortunately, the opinions inform less and less, adding to confusion
at the bar and in the lower courts and, ironically, breeding yet
more litigation. Along the way, the authority of the Court has
eroded as the authoritativeness of its opinions has diminished.
The declining authority of the Court's output is not solely a
function of bureaucratization. Part of the reason the Court is talking so much, both on and off the bench, is that it is adrift-not
only ideologically, but also with respect to its proper role. The
Court cannot at once be both a court of appeals and errors and a
court of ultimate constitutional interpretation. As long as the
Court tries to be the former, it will surely lack the time and perspective to be the latter.
I. ACROSS HISTORY ON HORSEBACK

A. "The Past is Prologue"
Almost from the beginning of its history, the Supreme Court
has been vexed by a workload that has threatened its capacity to
perform its functions well. There have always been disputes as to
whether judges are overworked, for there are no quantitative standards, much less qualitative ones, by which to measure the judicial
product. Measurement has tended to be subjective rather than objective. At the founding, controversy raged over the question
whether Supreme Court Justices could assume the burden of riding circuit as well as sitting en banc on the highest court of the
land. Even when Supreme Court dockets were sparse, circuit riding
was a chore, a danger to life and limb if not a challenge to intellectual capacity. When the Court came to have more on its own plate
than could readily be consumed, it abandoned circuit-riding duties
without a nod to congressional hegemony over judicial duties.1
Even after the Judges' Bill of 1925 2 -the most extensive limitation on the right of access to the Supreme Court since its crea1
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tion-sought to relieve the Justices of most of their compulsory
appellate jurisdiction by giving them discretion to choose which
cases they would hear,' the controversy about too much business
has surfaced frequently. The cancer-like growth of certiorari business has put the Court in the position of the Sorcerer's Apprentice:
petitions for certiorari come in an ever growing stream. The Justices won't close the valve; Congress hasn't tried.
When Franklin Roosevelt sought to cut back on the Supreme
Court's power to interfere with the New Deal's social and economic
legislation, he used the patently false excuse of excessive business.
The Court itself, through a letter from Chief Justice Hughes joined
by Justices Van Devanter and Brandeis, met the attack in terms of
its capacity to perform the business with which it was charged.4 In
essence, these Justices said that the Court was current with its
business and the proposed additional judges would make it more,
rather, than less, difficult to perform its chores. By the measures
used by Hughes, Van Devanter, and Brandeis, the Court has continued to be current in its business. At least down to the 1982
Term, it has carried over no cases ready for decision. ("Ready for
decision" means that briefing is completed and oral arguments
have been heard; it does not mean that all cases in which certiorari
has been granted have been disposed of. This backlog has, indeed,
been increasing.)
But early in the life of the Judges' Bill it became apparent
that the growth of certiorari business would soon enervate the
Court's capacity to afford ample attention to its function of providing judgments supported by reasons. 5 And by 1959, the Court's
certiorari business was far more extensive than anything contemplated by the 1925 law. Professor Henry Hart, in The Time Chart
of the Justices,0 demonstrated that the Justices had little or no
time to think about what they were doing. Judge Thurman Arnold
argued, in response, on the basis of his "realistic jurisprudence"
and his judicial experience, that judges didn't need time to think
because judicial responses to arguments were visceral rather than
rational.7 By way of rejoinder, Dean Erwin Griswold supported the
possibility that rational argument could, indeed, change minds; it
3 F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 260-73.
4 See L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK 157-61 (1967).
5 F. FRANKFuRTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 1, at 287.
a Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959).
Arnold, ProfessorHart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298 (1960).
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had even happened to him.8 Unfortunately, this controversy, like
so many before and since, was regarded as a conflict between the
benighted disciples of Frankfurter and the enlightened followers of
Douglas. The chief of the enlightened "liberals" entered the fray
directly. In 1960, Douglas made it clear that the Court was, if anything, underworked.9 The best evidence on this score was his own
example of dispatching his judicial work quickly and without much
effort while carrying on all sorts of other activities at the same
time.
The problem of an underworked Court cannot be so easily disposed of by rhetorical responses. Some Justices of quick minds can
reduce complex problems to ready resolution by formulas that can
be changed to meet the facts of each case. Not all the Justices,
however, have had the capacity for such ready answers that Justice
Douglas had. Some were not as bright. The intelligence of others
showed them the complexity, rather than the simplicity, of cases.
Some couldn't write as easily. Some thought it appropriate to consuit with their colleagues. An electronic machine could dispose of
more cases than the Court sees each year, but arbitrary conclusions
without reasons do not afford guidance for the resolution of future
disputes. Nevertheless, the 1960's alarums and excursions about
the business of the Court soon passed into obscurity.
The problem surfaced once more a decade later, when the
Freund Commission brought in a report suggesting that an additional court be created to help in the certiorari process and to determine some cases of importance, but not of such great importance as to warrant decision by the Supreme Court.10 The Justices
again expressed themselves forcefully on the question. They were,
of course, divided."' The Freund Report foundered, but the prob* Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term-Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-ProfessorHart and Judge Arnold, 74 HRv. L. REv. 81 (1960).
9 Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1960); cf. J.
HARLAN, MANNING THE DIKES (1958), reprinted in 2 BENiAmN N. CARDOZO LECTURES (n.d.)

(stating that the Court remained current in its business btit warning that continued growth
in certiorari practice could someday endanger the Court's ability to decide important
issues).
10 FEDERAL JUDIcIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SurREmE COURT (1972) (Paul A. Freund, chairman), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972).

n See, e.g., Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. Cm. L.
REv. 473 (1973); Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEw REPUBLmc, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14;
Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal "FundamentallyUnnecessary
and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A. J. 835 (1973); Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief
Justice Burger Defends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal,59 A.B.A. J. 721
(1973).

Alexander M. Bickel, who had been a member of the Freund Commission, produced a
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lem refused to go away.
In 1973, Congress created a Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, chaired by Senator Roman L.
Hruska, with a broader mandate to consider the crush of business
throughout the federal courts but, nonetheless, with strong emphasis on the Supreme Court's troubles. This time the group was untainted by Frankfurter epigoni. Its members were appointed by the
Senate, the House, the President, and the Chief Justice. The
make-up was different, but the recommendations were substantially the same. The Commission, too, recommended a National
Court of Appeals to relieve the Supreme Court of a part of its burdens. 2 The Justices were polled by the Commission, and again the
Court was divided. The Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist seemed to agree on the existence of
the problem, if not on the solution. Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, and Marshall thought that whatever problems might exist
were soluble by minor adjustments, a finger in the dike here or a
stuffed rathole there.13
Shortly thereafter, Professor (now Dean) Gerhard Casper and
Professor (now Judge) Richard A. Posner did a study of the problem for the American Bar Foundation. 14 Their conclusion was that
"we are not persuaded that the Supreme Court's workload has
reached the point at which radical changes in the Court's jurisdiction or in the structure of federal appellate review should be contemplated."1 5 This conclusion was confirmed by their follow-up
study of the 1975 and 1976 Terms." Thus, if by 1976 the Freund
and Hruska reports were not sunk without a trace, they were, at
best, derelicts on the sea of judicial reform.
B.

The Summer and Fall of '82: The Justices Take to the Hustings Again and Senator East Offers Some Solutions

Speechmaking to bar associations and law schools is a normal
part of the judicial calendar, and it is emphasized during the sumsterling defense of the report. A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1973). But
the joinder of Bickel with Freund led again to the characterization of this action as a
Frankfurterian conspiracy.
" COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND

INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975).
13 Id. at 172-88.
" G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1976).
25 Id. at 117.
16 Casper & Posner, The Caseload of the Supreme Court: 1975 and 1976 Terms, 1977
SUP. CT. REv. 87.
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mers and particularly at the meetings of the American Bar Association. The speeches on these occasions frequently take the form of
explanations or excuses for some dubious judicial behavior at the
previous Term.1" Where the Justices, burdened as they are, find
the time for such extracurricular activities remains something of a
mystery. But their attendance at many moot court arguments, bar
association talks, testimonial dinners, and law school lectures cannot be gainsaid. It may be that a little "moonlighting" is necessary
to stave off the hardships of inflation.1 8
In 1982, the festival of autumnal speeches seemed concentrated on the subject of the burden of business. 19 There was, of

course, no consensus about solutions, and some of the Justices
even expressed the heterodoxy that Congress should address the
problem, 0 perhaps as it did in 1925. But it should be remembered
that the 1925 law was written by the Justices, particularly by Justice Van Devanter, even though it was a congressional enactment.
There is some real danger to the Court's function as ultimate arbiter of the Constitution-an assumed function to be sure-if Congress were to act without the Court's guidance. National legislators
have already suggested the desirability of reducing the Court's jurisdiction, particularly in the areas of abortion, school prayer, and
school busing.2 It may indeed prove temerarious to invite Con17 Consider the remarkable extrajudicial and post-hoc opinions of Justices Blackmun,

Stevens, and Powell on Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). See Denniston,
Closed Trial Ruling Hit by Blackmun, Washington Star, Aug. 28, 1979, at A73, col. 3;
Greenhouse, Stevens Says Closed Trials May Justify New Laws, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979,
at 41, col. 1; Kiernan, Ruling on Press Shows High Court Confusion, Washington Post,
Sept. 17, 1979, at C1, col. 1.
18 The Justices have done their best to ensure continued increments in their salaries.
See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
"' See White, Challenges for The U.S. Supreme Court and the Bar: Contemporary
Reflections, 51 ANTrrRuST L.J. 275 (1982); Remarks of Justice Brennan, Third Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 9, 1982) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); Remarks of Chief Justice Burger, Arthur T. Vanderbilt Dinner (Nov. 19, 1982) (on file with
The University of Chicago Law Review); Speech by Justice Powell, Division of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1982) (on 'file with The University of Chicago Law Review), reprinted in modified form in Powell, Are the FederalCourts Becoming
Bureaucracies?,68 A.B.A. J. 1370 (1982); W. Rehnquist, Are the True Old Times Dead?,
Mac Swinford Lecture, University of Kentucky (Sept. 23, 1982) (on file with The University
of Chicago Law Review); Remarks of Justice Stevens, American Judicature Society Annual
Banquet (Aug. 6, 1982) (on fie with The University of Chicago Law Review).
20 E.g., White, supra note 19, at 281-82; Remarks of Justice Stevens, supra note 19, at
11-15.
2' See Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalLimitations
on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L.
Rlv. 17 (1981). See also G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERILAS ON CONSTITUTMNAL LAW 1
(Supp. 1982).
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gress to limit the Supreme Court's burden of cases, especially when
the cure for the expansive and expanding docket may lie within
the control of the Justices themselves.
1. The CertiorariPractice.When Justice Stevens revived the
notion that the certiorari process be delivered to another court for
the selection of cases for Supreme Court decision, 2 he was, of
course, familiar with the sorry history of the Freund and Hruska
reports. And if this is the most radical suggestion for extrajudicial
action-it would require congressional legislation-it is also the
most likely long-term remedy. The proposition is that if the certiorari selection process were given to other judges, the Supreme
Court Justices could put their energies and talents where they belong: resolving important cases on the merits and writing opinions
that justify their judgments. It would, incidentally, eliminate the
prejudgment of cases that inheres in the two-step process-certiorari and merits-in a single court.
There is no indication that Stevens has swung any of his
Brethren's votes to this goal. But if the proposal is not considered
solely on its own but as one of several alternatives that Congress
may choose to reduce the Court's business, it may look better to
some Justices than it does now.
Justice Brennan's obdurate opposition to surrendering the certiorari process to another court2 seems a bit disingenuous in light
of the facts. Brennan regards the certiorari process as an essential
part of the Supreme Court's judging function. It is by this means
that the Court is kept abreast of the growth in the law, especially
with regard to new problems and new solutions. Moreover, it is
asserted that the process can only function when the participants
are experienced judges. Since Justice Brennan is one of the few
(and perhaps the only one) of The Nine who reads the petitions for
certiorari for himself, he has standing to assert the importance of
the process being manned by the Justices. But the fact of the matter is that the certiorari process as it exists now in most of the
Justices' chambers is left to the rather inexperienced-however
bright-recent graduates of law schools, who rely on summer clerkships with law firms to supply the wisdom of experience that Brennan suggests is essential.
Justice Stevens described the actual process rather than an
idealized one in his James Madison Lecture at the New York Uni-

":

Remarks of Justice Stevens, supra note 19, at 11.

3 Brennan, supra note 11, at 476; Remarks of Justice Brennan, supranote 19, at 11-15.
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versity Law School.2 4 Speaking of the legislative history of the 1925
Judges' Bill, Stevens said:
Several features of the Court's practice were emphasized
in order to demonstrate that the discretionary docket was being processed in a responsible, nonarbitrary way. These four
are particularly worthy of note: (1) copies of the printed record, as well as the briefs, were distributed to every justice;
(2) every justice personally examined the papers and prepared
a memorandum or note indicating his view of what should be
done; (3) each petition was discussed by each justice at conference; and (4) a vote was taken, and if four, or sometimes
just three, justices thought the case should be heard on its
merits, the petition was granted.2 5
That is the process on which the opposition to removal of the
certiorari process from the Supreme Court is based. But what was
true in 1925 is no longer true. Time has brought successive and
fundamental changes in the process:
In the 1947 Term, when I served as a law clerk to Justice
Rutledge, the practice of discussing every certiorari petition at
conference had been discontinued. It was then the practice for
the Chief Justice to circulate a so-called "dead list" identifying the cases deemed unworthy of conference discussion. Any
member of the Court could remove a case from the dead list,
but unless such action was taken, the petition would be denied without even being mentioned at conference.2 6
Since 1947, the certiorari process has disintegrated even further with regard to the Justices' participation:
In the 1975 Term, when I joined the Court, I found that
other significant procedural changes had occurred. The "dead
list" had been replaced by a "discuss list"; now the Chief Justice circulates a list of cases that he deems worthy of discussion and each of the other members of the Court may add
cases to that list. In a sense, the discuss list practice is the
functional equivalent of the dead list practice, but there is a
symbolic difference. In 1925, every case was discussed; in 1947
24 J. Stevens, The Life Span of A Judge-Made Rule, The James Madison 1982 Lecture,
New York University Law School (Oct. 27, 1982) (on file with The University of Chicago
Law Review).
11 Id. at 20-22 (footnotes omitted).

2 Id. at 23-24.
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every case was discussed unless it was on the dead list; today,
27
no case is discussed unless it is placed on a special list.

Perhaps the change from "dead list" to "discuss list" may be
said to be merely "symbolic." But when those lists are not, in fact,
determined by the Justices but by their law clerks, there is a basic
distinction between the two processes. As Stevens noted:
It is no longer true that every justice personally examines the
original papers in every case. .... Today law clerks prepare
so-called "pool memos" that are used by several [six?] justices
in evaluating certiorari petitions. The pool memo practice
may be an entirely proper response to an increase in the volume of certiorari petitions from seven or eight per week when
the judges' bill was passed in 1925 to approximately 100 per
week at the present time. It is nevertheless noteworthy that it
is a significant departure from the practice that was explained
to the Congress in 1924.28

The proposal for transferring the certiorari process to another
court would clearly require congressional action. Congress could
bring this about without the acquiescence of the Justices themselves, but it is highly unlikely that Congress would act over the
objections of a majority of the Court. And it would appear plain
that Stevens's call may be a voice crying in the wilderness. In any
event, none of the other Justices who spoke to the question in recent days seems willing to endorse the proposition.
2. The Problem of Bureaucracy and the "Puisne Court." The
Justices are cognizant of the contention that the difficulties in operating the Court are due to the bureaucratization of the institution. The argument is that the judicial function of the Supreme
Court has been reduced to supervision of staff operations by each
Justice in his own chambers-that the Justices act like Cabinet
and sub-Cabinet officers in the executive branch, commanding the
production of answers, which they approve or disapprove, but in
which the Justices have little or no input. The suggestion is that
the law clerks make the initial determination as to the grant of
review and that the law clerks draft the opinions for which they
seek the imprimatur of their respective masters.
Although Justice Powell purported to address the problem of
bureaucratization in his ABA speech, he skirted it in favor of
:7

Id. at 24.

8 Id. at 24-25.
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warning that the increasing business of the courts would ultimately
result in bureaucratization which, he said, hadn't quite taken place
yet, so far as the Court was concerned. He asserted that, "although
the assistance of able law clerks is essential, the decisions and
opinions are those of the Justices."2 9 We should be better informed
to make our own judgment were it possible to see what the roles of
the law clerks really are, admitting that they will differ from chambers to chambers.
Judge Learned Hand, at least once, told a law clerk who asked
to draft an opinion that he could do so as soon as he was nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and commissioned by the Secretary of State. Until then, the law clerk was told,
it was for Hand to make the decisions and write the opinions, subject to correction by the law clerk who had the task of reading the
record. How much of the Supreme Court Justice's opinion is informed by the law clerk's memorandum and how much of it is the
law clerk's memorandum is probably correctly kept within the
bosom of the Justice's chambers. It would be interesting to some,
however, to turn the analysts loose with their electronic counters
to see whether consistency of style and prose could assure us that
the same writer was at work from Term to Term and within each
Term.
3. Specialized Courts and the Conflicts Problem. For some
Justices, the problem of an overburdened certiorari docket and, indeed, an overburdened plenary docket is attributable in large measure to the number of conflicting rulings by the twelve federal
courts of appeals (and the high courts of the states). There is, in
fact, little hard evidence that actual conflicts of decision exist in
large numbers. Certainly, reading the opinions of the Court does
not reveal a large number of cases in which certiorari has been
granted to resolve such conflicts. The fact is that there is no agreement among the Justices as to when such a conflict exists.30 In any
event, the proposed intermediary court to screen certioraris is not
confined to this question, and so a different legislative answer to
avoid conflicting rules by way of creation of new courts has been
suggested by Justice White and endorsed by Justice Brennan.*
" Speech by Justice Powell, supra note 19, at 16, reprinted in modified form in 68
A.B.A. J. at 1372.
30 Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S. Ct. 240, 240 (1982) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
the petition for writ of certiorari).
* The Chief Justice has, since this paper was prepared, suggested the creation of a new
national court to which some, if not all, conflicts among the circuits might be referred. See
Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 447 (1983). Cf.
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Justice White, in his remarks, suggested that a "national court
of appeals" was not a live possibility. He pointed out that a bill to
create such a court has been pending in Congress without going
anywhere. But, he said, there are other alternatives to consider:
Rather than one Supreme Court, there might be two, one for
statutory issues and one for constitutional cases; or one for
criminal and one for civil cases. If the resolution of conflicting
decisions is at the root of the problem, there is also the option
of creating new courts of appeal [sic] that would hear appeals
from district courts countrywide in certain kinds of cases."1
The possibility of two Supreme Courts would, of course, require
constitutional amendment. The notion of statutorily created specialized appellate courts, like the Emergency Court of Appeals, at
least drew the interest of Justice Brennan. 2 What the jurisdiction
of such courts would be is far from clear. Should there be a specialized court of appeals for tax cases, or labor cases, or section 1983
cases? Could such courts, in effect, replace the several courts of
appeals whose jurisdiction is geographically rather than substantively distinguished? We are a long way from the structure of specialized appellate courts. But there is no reason why the proposition doesn't deserve some attention.
The specialized courts, however, would be an answer to but
one of the pressures on the Supreme Court. Essentially, the argument is that where there are conflicts of judgments between or
among courts of appeals and/or high state courts on federal questions, the Supreme Court must resolve them in order for the federal law to be uniform throughout the nation. Some Justices would
not regard the problem as serious. Why not different rules for different parts of the country? But the more difficult question is
when does such a conflict exist?
Justice White had an alternative solution for this conflict
problem. He suggested that a court of appeals be required to sit en
banc before rendering a decision in conflict with that of another
circuit. He would then make the en banc opinion the governing
rule for the entire nation until changed by the Supreme Court.
Justice Walter V. Schaefer has another solution. He suggests that

Hutchinson, Burger Needs to Define His Court Before CreatingNew One, L.A. Times, Feb.
9, 1983, at 11-5, col. 1.
31 White, supra note 19, at 281. See Kurland, Jurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 616 (1974).
31 Remarks of Justice Brennan, supra note 19, at 15.
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there ought to be no such thing as a "rule for the circuit," that a
Sixth Circuit opinion should be just as binding in the Eighth Circuit as an Eighth Circuit opinion now is.a3 Obviously there are answers to the conflict problem that do not necessitate the restructuring of the judicial system. As Justice Stevens told the American
Judicature Society: "the number of unresolved conflicts is exaggerated." 4 To the degree that there are conflicts among decisions construing congressional statutes, Stevens would leave their resolution
to congressional action. Perhaps Stevens is not adequately conscious of the difficulties of congressional enactment of any law. The
law of inertia is probably the most important governing principle
of legislative action. The fact that different circuits have read congressional language differently is not likely to move Congress to
action, any more than it has been moved to action by Supreme
Court decisions glaringly inconsistent with the language, legislative
history, and plain intent of Congress. 5
4. Compulsory Jurisdiction.Apparently all of the Justices are
agreed that a statute abolishing appeals of right is devoutly to be
wished. How much time would thus be saved is a matter of dispute. Whether appeals are treated differently from petitions for
certiorari is hardly clear. The rule of four is apparently equally applied to appeals as to petitions for certiorari. But there is little
disagreement about the proposed change.
5. CongressionalRelief. Several of the Justices seem to have
thrown up their hands and invited Congress to address the problem of the Court's workload. This is a little like the sheep inviting
the wolf to afford them protection. There are many congressmen
ready to oblige.
Senator East, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers-the onetime bailiwick of
Senator Sam Ervin-has already introduced S. 3018.6 The testimony of the Justices on the desirability of the bill would surely be
enlightening. The bill proposes the following:
(1) It would forbid Supreme Court review of "any case
wherein any party claims the abridgement by a State, or by any
political subdivision, agency, or any other authority of a State, of
Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452 (1983); see also Schaefer,
Foreword: Stare Decisis and the "Law of the Circuit," 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 565, 568-69
(1979) (contending that intercircuit conflict can deprive litigants of equal protection as
guaranteed by the Constitution).
34 Remarks of Justice Stevens, supra note 19, at 13.
15 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
36

S. 3018, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:628

any right secured by the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States"; 7 it would also deny lower federal court
jurisdiction over any such actions."' In sum, the first eight amendments would be returned to the pristine purity they enjoyed when
first promulgated of being applicable only to the national government and not to the states. Surely this would substantially reduce
the business of the federal courts as well as the civil liberties of the
people.
(2) The bill would eliminate the "exclusionary rule" under the
fourth amendment, i.e., evidence secured in violation of the fourteenth amendment might constitutionally be admitted. 9 While
this would eliminate some federal court business, the concomitant
provision to protect against police abuses of the rights against invalid arrest, search, and seizure would probably add considerable
business. The bill provides that any violation of these protections
should be subject to punishment for contempt of court in summary
proceedings.40 Thus, the bill would sacrifice both the civil rights of
criminal defendants and those of accused officers of the law.
(3) Habeas corpus for persons in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court would be available in federal courts
only on a ground which presents a substantial Federal constitutional question, and then only if-i) it was not previously
raised and determined, 2) there has been no fair and adequate
opportunity to raise it and have it determined, and 3) it cannot thereafter be raised and determined in a proceeding in a
State court, by an order or judgment subject to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of certiorari. 1
(4) Cases arising under section 1983,42 certainly a prolific provider of federal cases, would be limited to cases asserting rights
directly under the Constitution or under federal statutes "providing for equal rights," provided there is no adequate remedy at
state law. 43 Surely we have here a substantial answer to the overweight problem of the Supreme Court docket.
(5) Attorneys' fees would no longer be awarded to prevailing
17 Id.
38

111l(a).

Id. § 112(a).

39 Id. §§ 121-122.
40 Id. § 123.

41 Id. § 131.
42 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
43 S. 3018, supra note 36, § 141.
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parties in civil rights actions. 44 This presumably would act as a disincentive to bring such suits.
(6) No causes of action could be implied from statutes unless
the statute "expressly grants such a cause of action."'45 Whether
this would, in fact, reduce the number of actions considered is dubious. The federal courts are thoroughly adept at finding causes of
action in the most unlikely language of federal statutes. They need
only label them as express rather than implied grants.
(7) General federal question jurisdiction would be abolished,
but diversity jurisdiction would be preserved.' 6
(8) Class actions would be cut back to what they were before
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure spawned their growth. 7

Surely this would cut down on business.
(9) No injunction could be issued against a state or state
agency except by a three-judge court.' The substitution of threejudge courts for one-judge courts would not only burden the trial
system, it would result in more direct appeals to the Supreme
Court without review by the courts of appeals. It is exactly this
direct appellate jurisdiction that almost every member of the
Court has been anxious to abolish as unduly burdening its docket.
Then, to keep the judiciary in line, there would be a congressional Joint Committee of Judicial Conduct to oversee the proper
functioning of the federal judiciary. The federal courts should be
required to meet the constitutional standard of "good Behaviour.'4 According to the bill, this standard prohibits
(1) abuse of judicial authority;
(2) improper exercise of judicial function;
(3) neglect or refusal to perform the duties of office;
(4) usurpation of the authority of the Congress, the President or the States;
(5) exercise of will instead of judgment by substituting
the pleasure of the judge for that of the legislature-either
Congress or the ratifiers of the Constitution of the United
States, as the case may be-rather than declaring the sense of
the law; and
(6) any other conduct which constitutes a failure to meet
4 Id. § 151.
45 Id. § 171.
46 Id. § 161.
47 Id. § 191.
48

Id. § 181(a).

49 U.S. CONST. art.

III, § 1.
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the standard of good behavior at common law at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution.5
The joint committee would review the official conduct of each
federal judge every ten years. The committee would have the
power of taking testimony and commanding the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and records. When the standard of good behavior is not met, the committee would recommend
impeachment proceedings to be brought in the House, but the existence of the committee would not foreclose the origination of impeachment proceedings by the House without benefit of committee
advice.5 1
Supreme Court Justices would be appointed geographically, so
that any appointee shall have been a resident for at least five years
of one of the circuits in which his predecessor served as Circuit
Justice. Finally, the bill would require that federal magistrates be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.5"
Clearly, Congress has the power to solve the problems of an
overburdened Court, as here, by removing a large part of its powers and reducing its independence by legislative oversight. Surely
the concept defined as "good behavior" is horrendous. The quality
of the federal judiciary is not now at its highest level. To what it
would be reduced by such congressional action is fearful to
contemplate.
Senator East's proposals are probably not exactly what those
Justices seeking succor from Congress had in mind. Surely they
sought abolition of three-judge courts, not their expansion; they
thought of elimination of the diversity rather than the federal
question jurisdiction; they might be desirous of some relief from
habeas corpus petitions by imposition of some notions of res judicata or exhaustion of remedies; they might be interested-although
they were themselves responsible for the expansion of section
1983-in some cutback in the scope of that statute. They would, I
think, be horrified at the abolition of suits against the states under
the Bill of Rights. The exclusionary rule is of their own creation
and could be cut back by them if they wished. So far, they have
not wished and would, I think, be dismayed at the alternative remedy of direct contempt proceedings. So, too, the "implied causes of

50S.

3018, supra note 36, § 202(b).
Id. §§ 202, 203, 207.
52 Id. §§ 221, 231.
"
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action" notion is a creature of the Court, not likely to be abandoned voluntarily.
Senator East's revolutionary proposal, which has all the subtlety of Madame Defarge's cure for the evils of the nobles of eighteenth-century France, is unlikely to become law. If Senator East
and his colleagues are trying to send the Court a message, they
would be well advised to make sure that the point does not backfire. Every time Congress proposes to teach the Court a lesson but
fails-due either to crudity or to lack of conviction-the message
returned is that the Court is beyond control. In the end, the
Court's power and the pattern of its exercise are not questioned
but confirmed, and we are left where we started.
6. Status Quo Ante. All in all, despite the effusion of judicial
rhetoric, it was to be expected that the Court would muddle
through. Speaking to the Antitrust Section of the ABA, Justice
White predicted the maintenance of the status quo ante, at least
unless and until the bar decided otherwise:
Ladies and gentlemen, the Court will go on writing our
150 opinions per year and granting those cases that four Justices think must be decided. I shall leave it to you and your
colleagues in the profession to help decide whether more cases
should be decided in a timely manner and if so what the preferred course to that end might be."
The assumption implicit in White's paper is that the problem is
that the Court doesn't decide enough cases on the merits. Here,
too, the Court is not of one mind. Stevens told us that "any mismanagement of the Court's docket has been in the direction of taking too many, rather than too few, cases.""
We cannot tell, of course, how many worthy cases were denied
review in recent Terms. It is quite apparent, however, from a simple reading of the United States Reports, that far too many unworthy cases have been granted review. Unless the function of the
Court is to correct errors below, a huge proportion of its docket is
concerned with cases that do not belong there because they have
little or no significance for anyone other than the parties to the
litigation. It is apparent that a large motivating force for the grant
of certiorari is to correct error, especially where that error is committed against the Court's special wards. Protecting the needy, the
minority, even the criminal defendant against governmental abuse

63

White, supra note 19, at 282.
J. Stevens, supra note 24, at 28.
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surely is an important function of government. Whether such largesse can be afforded by a Court no longer a mere dispute-resolving agency but a principal lawmaker of the nation is a different
question with a different answer.
It is certainly ironic that a Court whose Justices spent part of
the summer lamenting the lack of time to consider and to decide
major issues are now devoting substantial resources not only to
filing dissents from denials of certiorari, but also concurrences in
denials of certiorari. 5 It is difficult enough, as most of the Justices
told us after the last Term ended, to make responsible decisions on
the merits and to explain them soundly; it is impossible to gloss
every lower court opinion that strikes an imprecise note. And if the
court spent its time writing sounder opinions that provided clearer
guidance, it would be faced with fewer temptations "to say what
the law is" 56 without the necessary predicate of exercising its
jurisdiction.
II.

PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF

If, as several of the Justices seem to believe, the problem of
the Supreme Court's workload is that the Court cannot decide all
the cases that plainly call for decision each Term, there can be no
final resolution short of congressional inhibitions on the jurisdiction of some or all of the federal courts. Without such change, the
prospect is for a Court falling further and further behind on its
dockets until it has to stop functioning. When that crisis arises,
Congress is almost certain to impose a solution, and whether it is
as horrendous as Senator East's or not will be determined by the
mood that dominates at the time.
If, however, as Justice Stevens has told us, with the apparent
concurrence of Justice Brennan, the Court is not deciding too few
cases on the merits but too many, there are internal changes that
might alleviate the problems, other than delegating judicial duties
to more and more functionaries to be performed in the names of
the Justices. Justice Powell has told us that the Supreme Court is
not a bureaucracy-yet.

55E.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Illinois, 103 S.Ct. 469, 469 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari); James v. United States, 103 S.Ct.
465, 465-67 (1982) (Brennan, J., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari);
Castorr v. Brundage, 103 S.Ct. 240, 240 (1982) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the
petition for writ of certiorari); Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 942 (1978) (Stevens,
J., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
56Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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"The Rule of Four"

The Supreme Court itself has its hand on the valve that determines the flow of cases to it for decision. It takes most cases only
at its own discretion. This power was conferred by the 1925 Act
exactly to give the Court control of its own docket. Since the 1925
Act, the self-regulating rule of the Court has been that if four Justices want a case to be heard, it will be heard. The rule of four has
been in existence since before the 1925 Act. But
[t]he "rule of four" is not a command of Congress. It is a
working rule devised by the Court as a practical mode of determining that a case is deserving of review, the theory being
that if four Justices find that a legal question of general importance is raised, that is ample proof that the question has
such importance. This is a fair enough rule of thumb on the
assumption that four Justices find such importance on an in57
dividualized screening of the cases sought to be reviewed.
Obviously, the description of the certiorari process afforded us
by the Justices does not suggest that such "individualized screening" is in fact afforded. In any event, the question of the sufficient
importance of the case is not resolvable by an absolute standard,
but only by a comparative one. And the principle stated by Justice
Frankfurter would be equally valid if the number were "three" or
"two" or "five" or "six" rather than four. The rule of four is a device by which a minority of the Court can impose on the majority a
question that the majority does not think it appropriate to address. Whatever merit there may be in such a proposition, it is
highly questionable when that imposition endangers the capacity
of the Court to deal with cases in which five, six, or more of the
Justices think that review is essential.
The Court is in a position to know what outsiders can only
guess: how many cases have been granted review because four Justices have voted for review, how many because five have done so,
and so on. It is also in a position to know how many cases can be
adequately decided on the merits without straining the fabric of
meaningful adjudication: judgment, not will or force. Having set
the number of cases it can adjudicate with some measure of quality, the Court can then reset the "rule of four" to become the "rule
of five" or "the rule of six." Nor would the change be chiseled into
stone any more than was the rule of four. In theory, at least, we are

57 Roger v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 529 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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concerned not with mere numbers, but with the far more important question of the quality of the Court's output. There surely is
evidence over the past decades that the quality of quality is indeed
strained.
The Justices can close down the valve. They need no congressional action here.
B. The Irresponsibility of the Bar
A large part of the Court's problem is that it is burdened with
so many unmeritorious demands on its time. Justice White said
that sixty percent of the petitions for certiorari are totally without
merit. Justice Stevens put the figure at eighty percent. Nor is it
petitions for certiorari alone that impose on the Court; one need
look only at petitions for rehearing to get a far larger number than
eighty percent.
The problem is that these demands on the Court's time are
comparatively costless to clients and are remunerative to counsel.
Perhaps some substantial costs should be imposed on those who
file meritless petitions. Perhaps, too, the names of counsel who file
these time-consuming but otherwise valueless documents should be
published. It is easy enough for the Court to list separately the
denials of certiorari in cases that never made it to the conference
room and those that did. Lawyers would then be better informed
about the Court's standards in this area and would have a basis for
telling their clients that they cannot take a fee for a worse than
useless act.
There are problems with such a solution. First, it requires confidence by the Justices in their law clerks' recommendations that
prevent a case from going to conference. Second, it would assume
some real standards on the part of the Court itself. One reason
that counsel cannot guarantee a negative reaction by the Court is
that the Court does, from time to time, grant review in cases patently beyond the pale.
What is needed, but not likely to be brought about, is a real
Supreme Court Bar, the equivalent of Queen's Counsel, selected on
the basis of experience and reputation, but chosen from those who
apply for the status. As of now, irresponsibility of counsel is a
prime cause of the undue mass of litigation that the Court is required to handle, even if disposition of some of it is most cursory.
C.

Oral Argument
It may be that the function of oral argument, as one of the
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Justices hinted, is to allow the Justices to be seen in public in the
full panoply of their gowns and chains in the most august setting
that the capital of our nation can afford. Certainly, it is true that
the Court in session is an awe-inspiring sight. The awe, however,
derives from the sight and not from the sound. For the most part,
the oral arguments presented to the Supreme Court are less impressive then those heard by the Justices in their attendance on
law school moots.
The oral argument is an anachronism surviving from the days
when the only arguments presented to the Court were in oral
rather than written form. The courts were not so burdened in
those days, the jurisprudence was more easily encapsulated, and
there was a Supreme Court bar including such worthies as Daniel
Webster and Luther Martin. There are a few cases in which oral
argument serves as a means of discovery by the Justices. But there
is no reason why this discovery could not be conducted better by
interrogatories than by oral deposition. Surely the answers would
be more meaningful, and the demeanor of the witness is not in
question.
Oral argument wastes a large part of the Justices' limited
time. It probably cannot be justified in terms of the enlightenment
it affords the Justices. It may be justified because the pageantry
involved really does enhance the image of an institution that is
regularly a target of its political peers and its critics in the press
and academia.
D. Amicus Curiae Briefs
It is probably true that the Justices do not see most of the
amicus curiae briefs that are filed with the Court. If that is so, the
Court is playing a cruel hoax on those who request their counsel to
file them. But to the degree that the Justices or their henchmen do
read amicus briefs, they are generally wasting valuable time. For
the most part, amicus briefs add nothing to the arguments that are
made by the parties. Frequently they are no more than a registration of the votes of a constituency on one side or other of the case,
underlining the legislative rather than judicial function of the
Court. Perhaps a retreat only to amicus briefs filed at the request
of the Court or by parties to litigation pending below whose cases
are likely to be resolved by the Supreme Court's decision would
afford some respite from an unnecessary chore. Instead, the present Court's rules and their application encourage what is, for the
most part, a waste of time, effort, and money in a useless function.
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E. Supreme Court Terms
Obviously the long summer break is anything but a full vacation for the Justices. The mailbags of petitions for certiorari may
still follow them wherever they go, as they used to do. But even if
the Justices receive only the clerks' memos on the petitions for certiorari, they have a great quantity of orders to dispose of at their
pre-October Term opening.
Nevertheless, the closing of one Term in June or July and the
opening of the next in October does create a discontinuity of significant proportions and can be attributed only to a history when
Terms were meaningful and when Washington was a torrid, disease-ridden summer location. The most immediate problem the
Term creates is the perceived need to finish up all opinions by the
June or July deadline. It is quite apparent from the large numbers
of important cases that come down at one time-late June or early
July-that judicial craftsmanship would be enhanced by the removal of the "decision by deadline" syndrome. So far as affording
themselves adequate time to escape the onerous tasks that are
theirs, the Justices could do what they do in the winter-recess for
three or four weeks and then return to their chores. Surely, six
weeks' vacation, which could be a real vacation, would suffice for R
& R. It is obvious that continuous confinement in one building
frays tempers, but surely a Justice will be no more aroused by
what he considers the inanities of a colleague if they are proffered
to him in summer than in winter. And Court sessions may have the
additional advantage of providing an excuse for not attending bar
association meetings at which the Justices are expected to say
something meaningful but not substantive.
F.

Opinions

Perhaps the principal consequences of the overburdened Supreme Court is the sleaziness of the opinions on the merits. The
opinions are long because the Justices lacked the time to write
short ones. It may well be that the Justices are following Marshall
Field's motto to give the customer what he wants. If so, they are
mistaking fashion for desire. The life of the law may not be logic,
but neither is it the experience of producing wordy law review
pieces with thousands of footnotes purporting to be encyclopedic
in their coverage of the subject.* (Perhaps if the opinions were
* See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983), and especially Justice O'Connor's

dissent, id. at 1658-59.
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shorter they would be able to be published in the United States
Reports before they became redundant by the cases of an intervening Term or two.) The syndrome is not confined to the Supreme
Court, but neither are any of the problems of an overwhelming
docket. Judge Alvin Rubin of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit put the problem and its solution cogently:
Let me mention one other time-consuming task of judges
that appears to me to be an obsessive preoccupation. It is our
concern, particularly at the appellate level, with trying to
write the kind of opinion that we think law school teachers
will consider scholarly. American judicial opinions surpass in
verbiage, in length and in citations those written anywhere
else in the world. Every judge should be required to give his
reasons for a decision, and these reasons should be sufficient
not only to explain the result to the litigants but also to enable other litigants to comprehend its precedential value and
the limits to its authority. It would suffice to do this if we
adopted a standard style of opinion, if we did not strive to cite
authority for elementary propositions and if we did not try to
emulate law review articles or impress our colleagues and the
bar by our scholarship. Occasionally each of us may render a
decision, perhaps in a highly significant case, that demands
exposition of the full palette of our talents, but I fear that
much of our time and the time of our clerks is spent merely in
seeking felicitous expression, adding citations and attempting
to produce works of art. It would be worthwhile for judges to
experiment with much simpler opinion models. We will succeed, however, only if we deinstitutionalize the demand for
scholarly opinions. A good motto for us might be: Sufficient
58
unto the case is the decision thereof.
Some lengthy opinions do provide an unworthy service of concealing the reasons for the decision or of treating a case as an idiosyncracy rather than as a potential precedent. But it is more
likely that there is merit to the proposition about cooks and the
broth, and too many law clerks spoil the opinions. It is, indeed,
unfortunate that of all of Frankfurter's worthy traits, his successors should imitate him in his weaknesses rather than his
strengths. For lengthy opinions are created not only at inordinate
cost to the chambers of the Justice who writes them, but also to
" Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the Federal Courts:the Tension Between Justice and
Efficiency, 55 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 648, 655 (1980).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:628

the time of the other Justices on the Court, whether they need
only read them, need to explain their agreement in result but not
in opinion, or need to write a dissent ticking off the majority opinion's propositions point by point ad infinitum.
More than anywhere else, the Court's mismanagement of its
own resources in the face of higher demands on its time manifests
itself in opinions that fail their primary obligation to explain and
to persuade. An A.L.R. note is written when a few paragraphs
would do;59 multiple opinions are filed that fail to provide any

guidance; 0 and, worst of all, opinions are issued that appear to be
ad hoc and divorced from other related bodies of law created by
the Court." There is no evidence that the proliferation of staff in
the last decade means that the Justices do not know what they are
saying, but there is a growing suspicion that they do not mean
what they say, or least do not mean it for more than the case at
hand. More is at stake than fastidiousness about doctrine or the
legitimate exercise of judicial power: the more the Court fails to
persuade its public, the more vulnerable are its own authority and,
eventually, its own power.
IIl.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is in a crisis, but it is largely a crisis of its
own making. The flood tide of business that currently faces the
Court is different in degree but not in kind from the problems that
have faced the Court from its inception. The issues are hoary, if
not intractable. But they go to the essence of the Court's role and
to the nature of the responsible exercise of power, not to questions
of mechanics or structure. We can no longer say, as our colleagues
Dean Casper and Judge Posner said, "not to worry" (and in any
event, the cure is worse than the disease). The Court's power rests
on its reputation. When that reputation falls far enough, another

"

Almost any recent case involving state power over interstate commerce serves as an
example. For an especially prolix treatment of what the Court viewed to be a very simple
question, see Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). See also Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
"0 For a recent example, see Northern Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102

S. Ct. 2858 (1982). See also Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-CreatedRights: The
Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 25. Cf. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. Rnv. 802 (1982). See generally Davis & Reynolds, Juridical
Cripples:Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DuKE L.J. 59.
61 For a particularly troubling recent example, see Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982),
and Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection?A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup.
CT. Rav. 167. See also Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309 (1982), discussed in Hutchinson,
supra, at 193-94.
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branch will step in and sort things out. There are signs that Congress, and perhaps a genial President, are prepared to do so.

